The purpose of this paper is to develop a dynamic model of insurgency. As Ghosh (2006) stated, "Civil wars are notoriously difficult to mediate without taking one side and it doesn't help that in Iraq, battling Shi'ites and Sunnis seem to agree on only one thing: that the U.S. 3 The Shi'a militia were claimed to have been responsible for many attacks on Sunni civilians in retribution for the terrorist attacks of Sunni extremists that have killed many Shi'a. While Sunni extremists attacked the U.S.-led coalition who were seen as defenders and supporters of the new Iraqi government, other groups such as the Shi'a militiamen were also believed to be major contributors to the ongoing violence. The Sunnis, who accounted for about 20% of Iraq's population, were now thrown into a position of being marginalized by the majority Shi'a and Kurdish leaders who dominated Iraq's transitional government after the overthrow of Saddam's regime. There was also an escalation of sectarian violence. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, Vol. 11).ġ John Keegan, The Iraq War, (New York: Random House, 2005), p. Moreover, Iraq seems to have replaced Afghanistan as a training ground where a new generation of Islamist militants can acquire military expertise and build personal relationships through the experience of combat and training camps (p. There seems to be a broad consensus among terrorism experts that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 has contributed negatively to the so-called "global war on terror." According to many analysts, the war and the subsequent occupation have increased the level of frustration in the Islamic world over American foreign policy and facilitated recruitment by militant Islamist groups. The notion that the presence of the coalition increased the size of the insurgency is given by Hegghammer (2006) in which he stated, These attacks were not only against the coalition troops, but were also against Iraqi citizens who were thought to have any ties to the coalition especially those in the newly created Iraqi police force and the new Iraqi army. The presence of more U.S.-led troops, however, further inflamed the insurgents who stepped up their attacks. Keegan (2005) stated, "such attacks persisted during the winter of 2003-04 and by March 2004 had swelled into a full-scale insurgency." 2 The coalition responded to insurgent attacks by sending more troops to Iraq. The kidnappings, attacks, and bombings, by the insurgents began. It became apparent that while many Iraqis welcomed the coalition and the prospect of democracy, there were others that despised what they felt was an occupational force. 3).Īfter the fall of Baghdad, the coalition soon began its reconstruction efforts building schools, hospitals, roads, the electrical power system and other parts of the Iraqi infrastructure. They had taken off their uniforms and become civilians again (p. The disappearance of the soldiers was easily explained. The Ba'ath leaders and their party officials had disappeared, just as the army and the Republican Guard had disappeared. 1 Keegan further stated that the U.S.-led coalition was surprised when it met little resistance in the early days of the war: According to Keegan (2005), the U.S.-led coalition faced an Iraqi army of 400,000 troops, twice its own size. On March 20, 2003, the U.S.-led coalition moved into Iraq the day after President Bush declared war. Be able to evaluate the utility of different approaches to studying insurgency and terrorism and apply these approaches to evaluate historical cases of terrorism and insurgency 4.Blank et al.: A Dynamic Model of Insurgency Identify existing theoretical approaches that have been applied to the study of political violence to address questions on the causes, consequences, and management of insurgencies and terrorism 3. Understand the historical evolution and recent trends in insurgency and terrorism 2. The goal for this course is to help students: 1. The course will also focus on groups, methods, ideologies, and organizational structures, and will address the effectiveness of different policies over time at managing insurgency and terrorism, and the role that these policies play in US strategy.Īcademic Year: 2021-2022 Semester(s): Fall Required/Elective: Elective Units: 9 Location(s): Pittsburgh Learning Objectives The course will cover the historical evolution of terrorism and insurgency as well as recent trends. How important is it to define terrorism and insurgency? What causes insurgencies, and what determines the choice of terrorism as a tactic within insurgencies? This course will go into depth to analyze the various manifestations of terrorism and insurgency. Some, like terrorism, are a tactic while others, like insurgency, are a strategy. There are many forms of political violence but not all are created equal. Terrorism and Insurgency Course Number: 84-389